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Summary: The Icelandic internet bank Icesave went bankrupt in 
late 2008. The insufficient Icelandic deposit guarantee scheme 
(Tryggingasjóður) did not resist the Icelandic financial meltdown and 
failed to compensate British and Dutch depositors the guaranteed 
sum of EUR 20,887 as settled in Directive 94/19/EC, which accor-
ding to the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) regulates the 
Icelandic financial sector. The British and Dutch deposit schemes paid 
out guarantees to their national Icesave depositors on behalf of the 
Icelandic scheme. Subsequently, an agreement was reached betwe-
en Iceland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. As part of the 
arrangement, the Icelandic government guaranteed the reimburse-
ment of the British and Dutch bridging loan. The Icelandic referendum 
of 6 February 2010 rejected the agreement and the Icesave Act, which 
torpedoed the Icesave reimbursement plan. The EFTA Surveillance 
Authority (ESA) issued a formal reprimand to Iceland. However, this 
has not been followed by any infringement proceedings as provided 
for by the EEA agreement. My position is that the ESA position results 
from a confusion of regulatory commitments with pecuniary liabilities. 
The key point is whether the Icelandic guarantee is in accordance 
with EU Directive 94/19/EC. The Directive requires the legislator to 
act. It is not a directive to force the government to pay (see Directive 
94/19/EC Article 3.1.) This provision contributes to the implementa-
tion of the ban on Member States against guarantee schemes that 
distort competition. The schemes are self-financing and fully paid by 
the financial institutions. In the case of insufficient coverage, all depo-
sitors are subject to an equal pro rata reduction in compensation, as 
the scheme guarantee of full payment of the deposit guarantee sum 
of EUR 20,887 is an objective to be reached within a reasonable time 
and not a legal right from day one. Government aid to top up the fund 
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is prohibited, whether it is the intention or consequence. The Icelandic 
government cannot cover the scheme’s insufficiency by granting mo-
ney to the fund. As the EU enjoys exclusive autonomy over its external 
relations, Member States cannot bilaterally arrange for such a solu-
tion. Thus, depositors not fully reimbursed are stuck with Icelandic 
bankruptcy proceedings. Claims are considered by the administrators 
in accordance with the Icelandic Bankruptcy Act on outstanding debts 
not paid out by the deposit guarantee scheme. 
Market disturbances could be caused by branches of credit institu-
tions which offer levels of cover higher than those offered by credit 
institutions authorized in their host Member States; whereas it is 
not appropriate that the level of scope of cover offered by guarantee 
schemes should become an instrument of competition. 
Directive 94/19/EC on deposit guarantee schemes, preamble, 14th 
recital
1. The topic for discussion
Are deposit guarantee schemes (the main-road solution; see Section 
3) a safe haven for depositors that entrusted their funds to failing finan-
cial institutions? Are national states’ bailouts the answer, or are perhaps 
ordinary bankruptcy proceedings the only way (the alternative route in 
Section 4)? 
This article debates the appropriateness of state intervention in the 
financial sector with respect to subsidisation, in particular focusing on the 
Icesave bankruptcy, the trilateral agreement between Iceland, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands1 and the EFTA Surveillance Agency’s cri-
ticisms of Iceland.2 Different opinions exist on the validity of the Icesave 
agreement.3 My position, as elaborated in this article, is that the trilateral 
agreement between Iceland, the UK and the Netherlands, amounts to illicit 
state aid and is therefore not in accordance with EU/EEA law. 
1 Agreement of 19 October 2009 between the UK, the Netherlands and Iceland. See the 
Letter of Intent between Iceland and the United Kingdom of 5 June 2009.
2 In its Letter of Formal Notice to Iceland, the EFTA Surveillance Authority on 26 May 
2010 accused Iceland of breaching EU Directive 94/19, Case Ni 65560 – Dec, No 224/10/
COL.
3 A spokesperson for HM Treasury said in The Guardian (London 6 June 2009): ‘The gov-
ernment welcomes Iceland’s commitment to recognise its obligations under the EC deposit 
guarantee scheme to repay depositors in Icesave’. For an opposite opinion, see Professor of 
economics John Kay, The Financial Times (London 24 February 2010), who characterised 
the Icesave agreement as ‘shameful bullying’. 
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While it is clear that ‘[t]here may be state financing at this level … [it] 
only requires that if that option is chosen, EU state aid rules are complied 
with’(emphasis added)4 The purpose of this article is to search for com-
petition law regulations in cases where solutions result from Directive 
94/19/EF,5 the Treaty on the Function of the EU (TFEU) Article 107 and 
the EEA Agreement Article 61 (state aid limitations).
It is an undisputed fact that the Icelandic deposit guarantee 
scheme (Tryggingarsjóður innistæðueigenda og fjárfesta, hereinafter 
Tryggingarsjóður, the fund or scheme) was liable to cover all depositors’ 
losses up to the sum of EUR 20,887 (which is about 1.7 million Icelandic 
krónur at a fixed, agreed exchange rate). However, since the total sum 
available was no more than 10.8 billion Icelandic krónur (EUR 68 million), 
funding was insufficient to cover all losses, which were approximately EUR 
3.75 billion. Thus, the trilateral arrangement put a loan at the disposal 
of the fund for the purpose of reimbursing British and Dutch depositors 
in full (EUR 20,887). As the growth expectancy of the Icelandic fund was 
modest, the British and Dutch parties demanded that the Icelandic go-
vernment guarantee the full performance of the contract, which in practice 
meant that Icelandic citizens were liable for the payment. The key point, 
however, is whether Directive 94/19/EC allows such public participation. 
Obviously, there was an EU-law perspective present during nego-
tiations. As told by the Icelandic Special Investigation Commission, the 
British and Dutch parties to the failing6 agreement had ‘no problem in 
finding support in European regulations for stopping irresponsible Ice-
landic banking activities … this “was the common understanding all over 
Europe”’.7 However, law abidance is an untidy game, especially when 
4 Statement by Chantal Hughes, Spokesperson of the European Commission, in answer 
to questions from various journalists on the Icesave and Deposit Guarantee Schemes (Press 
Conference, Brussels 3 August 2010). On-the-record statement on deposit guarantee sche-
mes.
5 The 1994 Directive was amended by Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 March 2009 amending Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee 
schemes as regards the coverage level and the payout delay [2009] OJ L 68/3. This was 
followed up in late 2009. See Financial services: Commission launches call for evidence on 
review of Investor Compensation Schemes Directive (IP/09/230) of 09/02/2009. Internal 
Market and Services Commissioner Charlie McCreevy said: ‘We want to gather informa-
tion on the practical application of the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive since it 
entered into force ten years ago, especially in light of the current financial crisis. This will 
help us to assess whether and how the Directive should be modified in order to better pro-
tect investors. I encourage all interested parties to give us their views’, Commission letter 
from Charlie McCreevy to the Norwegian former Minister of Finance Kristin Halvorsen, jno 
001582 (1 October 2009). 
6 See EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 2: ‘To date, these negotiations have not resulted 
in an agreement being reached’.
7 P Hreinsson, T Gunnarsson and S Benediktsdóttir, Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis, The Spe-
cial Investigation Commission (SIC) Report of 12 April 2010, Althing Act No 142/2008, 
Chapter 18 Deposits in financial institutions 59.
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public authorities like De Nederlansche Bank (The central bank of the 
Netherlands) stated the following: ‘The deposit-guarantee schemes in the 
European Economic Area are a mess’.8
While law and economics is an important sector of jurisprudence, 
my effort here is neither to examine legislative issues on good governance 
within the financial sector nor predict the ultimate outcome of the EU’s 
ongoing political discussions on banking policy revision. This article is 
mainly legal dogmatic and relates to the question of illicit state aid to the 
banking sector. Is the government of Iceland breaching EEA-law when 
agreeing to reimburse Dutch and British deposit guarantee schemes?
This article progresses as follows: section 2 presents certain basic 
facts; section 3 considers the legality of the proposed trilateral agreement 
with a special emphasis on the governmental reimbursement guarantee; 
section 4 outlines the legal status of the alternative route under Icelandic 
bankruptcy provisions; section 5 concludes the article.
2. The case: a short review
The race to the bottom had begun in late 2007, as central banks 
globally began to lower collateral standards for open market opera-
tions … Ireland surprisingly in September 2008 removed any limits 
on bank deposit insurance coverage, which prompted Germany to 
follow suit and left Britain confronted with the threat of large deposit 
outflows. Soon much of the rest of Europe was raising coverage li-
mits. Rather than containing the rush to nationalization of the bank 
funding base, the EU Economic and Financial Affairs Council fueled 
the race by proposing to massively expand minimum coverage to 
50,000 [euros] and shorten payout periods while allowing member 




Icesave, a subsidiary of the Icelandic bank of Landsbanki, was esta-
blished in 2006 as a purely internet bank, gaining customers at first in 
8 Hreinsson et al (n 7) s 58.
9 HJ Dubel, ‘Europe’s Second Pillar: a European Deposit Insurance System, Complement-
ing Monetary Union, Can Help to Contain the European Race’ (2008) (fall) Entrepreneur 
Magazine. <http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/191646692_3.html> ac-
cessed 21 October 2010.
10 For a detailed presentation of the background, see Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Icesave_dispute> accessed 26 October 2010.
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the United Kingdom and later (spring 2008) in the Netherlands. Its poten-
tial resulted from aggressive marketing offering sky high interest rates. 
Icesave, operating in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, was the 
recipient of a tremendous sum of deposits due to its deposits policy. Whi-
le the average Central Bank of England discount rate was 4.75% at the 
time of its British start-up, Icesave offered interest at 6.2%. The Dutch, 
following the European Central Bank (ECB) discount rate of 3.75%, beca-
me the victim of Icesave ‘predator’ interest rates of 5.25%, which resulted 
in billions of euros of fresh injections into the Icelandic banking industry. 
This aggressive policy led to a strong ‘dissatisfaction within the Central 
Banks in those European countries where the Icelandic banks had star-
ted raising deposits with high interest rates’.11 
Icelanders, however, were not offered such advantageous terms. 
This resulted in an inflow of Dutch and British funds to the benefit of the 
Icelandic Landsbanki, the owner of Icesave.
Due to the still not fully harmonised EU rules on bank compensati-
on schemes,12 national funds may offer different coverage provided that 
all financial institutions operating within one state are part of a national 
treatment scheme; ie that all banks enjoy the right of topping up. Whi-
le Tryggingarsjóður’s guarantee covers up to EUR 20,887, the coverage 
of the British fund (Financial Services Compensation Scheme, FSCS) is 
GBP 36,000 (about EUR 43,000). The Dutch fund offers compensation 
up to EUR 100,000. As will be shown, this maximum delimitation not 
only addresses the depositor, but also the Member State.
Clearly the British and Dutch Icesave bank deposits were the sole re-
sult of the Icelandic predator interest rate: ‘the deposit volume [started to] 
fall off when the banks stopped offering best-in-market interest rates’.13
Due to the failed Icesave refund of Dutch (of total deposits of EUR 1.7 
billion, EUR 1.3 billion to be repaid) and British deposits (of total deposits 
of EUR 4.1 billion, EUR 2.35 billion to be repaid), the two states decided 
to honour obligations to all domestic depositors. In the Netherlands, ‘Ice-
11 Hreinsson et al (n 7) 63.
12 This, however, is about to happen. The Former Norwegian Minister of Finance, Kristin 
Halvorsen argued in a letter to the EU Commission on 4 September 2009 that Norway was 
eligible, within the framework of the EEA, to keep the special Norwegian deposit scheme 
roof of 2 million Norwegian kroner (EUR 250,000) and thus refused to abide by the draft 
EU limitation (EUR 100,000 maximum). A Commission letter  from Charlie McCreevy, jno 
001582 (1 October 2009), is, however, in the negative: ‘If a neighbouring EEA country could 
apply a 135% higher coverage level, this would lead to a significant competitive distortion’ 
(p 1).
13 MJ Flannery, ‘Iceland’s Failed Banks: A Post Mortem’, in Vidauki 3 til Rannsóknarnefnd 
Alþingis, Report prepared for the Icelandic Special Investigation Commission (November 
2009) 106. <http://sic.althingi.is/pdf/RNAvefVidauki3Enska.pdf> accessed 22 October 
2010.
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save savers qualify for compensation up to EUR 100,000 each’.14 In the 
United Kingdom, the depositors ‘will receive their money in full’15 (ie GBP 
36,000). The explanation was simply that solutions to the contrary would 
result in furious reactions among people in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. Despite insufficient Icelandic coverage, the necessity of po-
litics overruled strict dogmatic law.
Subsequently, these domestic British and Dutch policies led to the 
trilateral agreement, which Icelanders overwhelmingly rejected in a refe-
rendum (98.4% against).
2.2. The EFTA Surveillance Authority’s position – a presentation
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA), in a letter of formal notice 
as the first step in infringement proceedings as provided for by the EEA 
agreement,16 expressed a criticism of Iceland’s breach of the trilateral 
agreement. Among its central premises are the following: 
1. Directive 94/19/EC ‘“imposes obligations of result on the EFTA 
States”.17 … Accordingly, the Authority considers that the Article 
imposes an obligation of result on the Icelandic Government’.18 The 
result was to honour the guarantee, which never happened. ‘To the 
Authority’s knowledge no payments at all have been made by the 
Fund’.19
2. The ‘Authority considers that the fund forms part of the Icelandic 
State within the meaning of the EEA Agreement although it is, in 
Icelandic law, constituted as a private foundation’.20
3. Such a result is to ensure that a ‘deposit guarantee scheme is set up 
that is capable of guaranteeing the deposits of depositors up to the 
amount laid down in Article 7(1)’.21 
4. The wording of Article 7 (1) is unconditional. It provides for a right to 
compensation in the event of deposits being unavailable.22 
14 See De Nederlandsche Bank decision of 11 December 2008 <http://www.dnb.nl/en/
news-and-publications/news-and-archive/news-2008/dnb208600.jsp> accessed 3 Octo-
ber 2010.
15 Se HM Treasury decision of 9 October 2008 <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
press_103_08.htm> accessed 1 October 2010.
16 By 18 October 2010, the ESA had not yet decided to deliver a reasoned opinion on the 
alleged Icelandic breaches of Directive 94/19/EC. See EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 15.
17 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 7. The same view is made even more explicit in the 
ESA press release of 26 May 2010: ‘Iceland is obliged to ensure payment of the minimum 
compensation to Icesave depositors in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, according 
to the Deposit Guarantee Directive’. 
18 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 8.
19 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 9.
20 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 9.
21 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 6-7; statement by ESA President Per Sanderud (press 
conference 26 May 2010). 
22 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 7.
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5. There is no ‘specific legislative provision’ in Directive 94/19/EC 
to justify exceptional circumstances to derogate from the above 
mentioned effects.23
6. No provision of Directive 94/19/EC indicates that the obligation ‘to 
refund deposits can be reduced in any way under any circumstance’.24
7. While domestic depositors ‘were covered in full … the foreign 
depositors did not enjoy that minimum guarantee … The principle 
of equal treatment … would be rendered meaningless if states were 
permitted to move some depositors out of a failing bank while leaving 
others there’.25
 From these premises, ESA draws the following conclusion: ‘The-
refore, as neither the Fund nor the government have ensured payment 
to those depositors in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom whose 
deposits became unavailable … Iceland has failed to comply with its obli-
gations under Article 7’.26 
I am not convinced by these arguments, as discussed in section 3.3. 
Here, I follow the position of distinguished Icelandic legal scientists: ‘All 
in all these arguments show that the Icelandic government has no res-
ponsibility for deposits made in domestic banks’ foreign subsidiaries at 
the time of the bankruptcy. No liability for the national state can result 
from the view that directives have been breached’.27 In the same vein, 
the Director of the Norwegian Deposit Guarantee Scheme stated: ‘If Lan-
dsbankinn had been under Norwegian jurisdiction, the bank’s subsidia-
ries abroad would not have been included in our national scheme’.28
Before I come to these issues, please let me first introduce the reader 
to a short description of EEA competition law, as implemented by Iceland. 
3. The ‘main road’ solution of deposit guarantee schemes 
In your letter you propose ‘topping up’ and an export ban as reme-
dies for competitive distortions. However … [f]rom a European per-
spective topping-up agreements pose difficulties as they introduce a 
discrepancy in the European financial safety net framework … These 
arguments plead for removing topping-up and for full application of 
23 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 10-11.
24 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 12.
25 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 13. 
26 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 8. See also the conclusion on p 15.
27 L Blöndal, S Líndal and SM Stefánsson, ‘Stjórnarskráin og Icesave-samningarnir’ (‘The 
Constitution and the Icesave Agreements’) Morgunblaðið (Reykjavik, 2 December 2009).
28 Statement by Arne Hyttnes in the Icelandic newspaper Morgenbladid (Reykjavik 18 Feb-
ruary 2010).
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the home country principle – which will effectively be in place with 
the full harmonisation of the coverage level as of end 2010.
Charlie McCreevy29 
Iceland is a member of the EEA and bound by its provisions. The 
internal market seeks to satisfy equality and non-discrimination of tra-
ders in all areas, including the financial sector: ‘Where domestic rules 
governing the capital market and the credit system are applied to the 
movements of capital liberalized in accordance with the provisions of this 
Agreement, this shall be done in a non-discriminatory manner’ (EEA Ar-
ticle 42.1). EU Directive 94/19/EC was incorporated into the EEA by 
EEA-committee decisions No 18/1994 and 12/1998. One of the main 
obstacles to domestic financial sector subsidisation is the Directive’s 
preamble, 13th recital: 
the retention in the Community of schemes providing cover for depo-
sits which is higher than the harmonized minimum may, within the 
same territory, lead to disparities in compensation and unequal con-
ditions of competition between national institutions and branches 
of institutions from other Member States … whereas it is not appro-
priate that the level of scope of cover offered by guarantee schemes 
should become an instrument of competition. 
A legal study has indicated that deposit security schemes have reached 
the attention of the Competition Directorate in connection with unlawful 
subsidisation:
In late 2008, the Irish decided that during the following two years, 
national state guarantees under Irish deposit guarantee schemes 
would increase to the benefit of deposits. The Irish scheme is similar 
to the Icelandic one. This decision included six Irish banks only. The 
British and several other Member States took the position that Irish 
policy contradicted EU competition law, since it implied state aid, 
which resulted in a distortion of competition. As a consequence, the 
common ground for financial sector competition in Europe was sha-
ken … Accordingly, the position among the dominant EU Member 
States, at the end of September 2008, was the rebuttal of borrowing 
arrangements guaranteed by a national state.30
Iceland transposed and implemented EC Directive No 94/19 with Act 
No 98/1999 on deposit guarantee schemes and the investment compen-
29 Statement by Charlie McCreevy (EU Commission letter 1 October 2009, j no 001582) to 
the former Norwegian Minister of Finance Kristin Halvorsen.
30 Blöndal et al (n 27). The Irish action prompted heavy criticism from Hans-Joachim 
Dubel, founder of Finpolconsult, Berlin (n 9). 
135CYELP 6 [2010] 127-152
sation system (see the Trade Department Statute of 21 February 2000). 
The key point is whether Iceland could live up to the rules of the game, 
which will be discussed later.
3.1. Iceland: domestic provisions on deposit guarantee schemes 
The basic question relates to the territorial reach of the Icelandic 
rules. Do we face extraterritorial effects: a long-arm reach in deposit gu-
arantee schemes? Do Icelandic rules embrace depositors living in the UK 
and the Netherlands? Since the Icelandic scheme transposes EC Direc-
tive 94/19, its reach closely follows the EU acquis: ‘Deposit-guarantee 
schemes introduced and officially recognized in a Member State in accor-
dance with Article 3 (1) shall cover the depositors at branches set up by 
credit institutions in other Member States’.
Thus, there is no doubt that foreign branches’ activities, like Icesave’s 
in the Netherlands and the UK, are included. To sum up: Icelandic depo-
sit guarantees cover the first EUR 20,887. The topping up of the British 
or Dutch scheme is covered by these countries’ respective schemes.
The deposit guarantee scheme of Iceland was established by Lög um 
innstæðutryggingar og tryggingakerfi fyrir fjárfesta (the Deposit Guaran-
tee Fund and Investment Compensation Fund Act) of 27 December 1999 
No 98 (hereinafter Icelandic Act No 98/1999) and the Ministry of Trade 
Statute of 21 February 2000. The implementation of this was achieved 
with the creation of Tryggingasjóður. Subsequently, Iceland established 
the Financial Supervisory Authority (FME) to supervise the depositor gu-
arantee scheme: ‘Each Member State shall ensure that within its territory 
one or more deposit-guarantee schemes are introduced and officially re-
cognized’ (Article 3.1). In addition, it is clear that the Member State will 
check that branches, such as the Icesave branch of Landsbanki, opera-
ting abroad ‘have cover equivalent to that prescribed in this Directive’ 
(Article 6.1). 
This fund covers all deposits up to EUR 20,887. Its status as a pri-
vate fund is stated in Article 2. All banks offering services in Iceland 
are obliged to become members. In accordance with Article 13, this also 
applies to foreign branches if their domestic coverage does not cover the 
Icelandic guarantee level. In such cases, membership is compulsory (Ar-
ticle 15). The contingent connection to a specific deposit guarantee fund 
should be communicated to the bank’s depositors (Article 12 i f).
The fund’s objective is to raise sufficient capital to resist financial 
meltdown in the banking sector. The emphasis is on the private financing 
of the fund (0.15% of bank deposits in the preceding year in accordance 
with Article 6), the minimum of which is 100 million Icelandic króner 
(Article 7). The provisions limit the national state’s engagements, as the 
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objective is a self-regulating financial sector independent of state aid or 
funding from guarantee schemes.
Some seem to think that all depositors enjoy a legal claim to the de-
posit guarantee sum, which in the Tryggingasjóður case is estimated at 
EUR 20,887.31
Setting aside the estimated compensation, the starting point is that 
Tryggingasjóður should pay depositors an amount equivalent to ‘the va-
lue of his stocks, shares and cash deposits’ (Article 9 Paragraph 1). This 
provision should be read in the context of Article 10, which regulates 
the case of insufficient funds. In this case, the scheme should refund 
all depositors up to 1.7 million Icelandic króner (based on the exchange 
rate vis-à-vis the Euro on 5 January 1999; ie EUR 20,887). Any surplus 
should be divided equally among all depositors. The explicit amount per 
investor is determined by the fund’s total size. Claims on the fund are 
final. Thus, a person that fails to regain his deposit through the claims 
settlement procedure is also unable to gain from future recovery from the 
fund. The settlement date therefore marks the end of the reimbursement 
claim, which also indicates that the guarantee sum of EUR 20,887 is 
nothing but a limited apportioned solution. No depositors may receive 
payment in full if the fund is insufficient. 
There is no obligation for the Icelandic state to top up the priva-
te fund of Tryggingasjóður (Act No 98/199 Article 2). But does the go-
vernment of Iceland have the right to contribute monetary support to 
the fund? Is an agreement with the British and Dutch governments an 
option? Is it in accordance with EU competition law to contribute money 
to the Icelandic fund?
The answer lies in Directive 94/19/EC, read in conjunction with 
other provisions of competition law. This is an area of EU common policy. 
Competition law grants the EU autonomy and pre-emptive powers. There 
are no remaining competencies with the Member States. This includes 
both domestic and foreign relations.32 State aid is valid under the TFEU 
Article 107(3) ‘by decision of the Council on a proposal from the Commi-
ssion’. Such a decision is necessary as Directive 94/19/EC presupposes 
that a deficiency removes the ability to borrow money and leaves no other 
option. Deviating from such a prohibition requires the relevant Member 
State to adopt a bill in accordance with Article 107(3). This, however, 
is not the case. No such proposals exist. Thus, the trilateral agreement 
between Iceland, the UK and the Netherlands is invalid. 
31 Per Christiansen, professor of law, now a judge at the EFTA Court (Aftenposten Oslo 12 
January 2010).
32 For a general discussion on the EU’s exclusive autonomy, see P Orebech, ‘The EU Com-
petency Confusion: Limits, Extension Mechanisms, Split Power, Subsidiarity and Institu-
tional Clashes’ (2003) 13 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 99-151.
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Even more compelling in the Icelandic situation is the fact that the 
country is party to the EEA only. To legally adapt to the challenging si-
tuation in the aftermath of the Icesave bankruptcy, it was necessary to 
implement a new EU solution in the EEA in line with procedures in EEA 
Part VII Chapter 2 (see especially Articles 102-104). 
Clearly, the direct trilateral contract and negotiations are not in line 
with the required procedure. Thus, Iceland enjoys no right of intervention 
in the decisions of Tryggingasjóður.
3.2. The Icesave agreement: an overview
First of all, it is necessary to make some comments on the legal 
context. Trade in services is the exclusive competence of the EU, the 
consequence of which is the pre-emptive force of the EU acquis, not only 
internally but also externally. Internal EU competence is mirrored by 
competence in external relations, which results from the principles of 
parallelism and implied power developed in the case law. Despite a lack 
of express power, the EU enjoys external competence that matches its in-
ternal common policies.33 Clearly, trade in banking services is fully within 
the EU’s competence. 
The agreement between Iceland, the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands was signed on 19 October 2009. The EU was not involved, at least 
not formally. The text builds on a Letter of Intent with the United King-
dom of 5 June 2009. Formally, the agreement is a civil law loan from the 
United Kingdom (GBP 2.35 billion) and the Netherlands (EUR 1.33 billi-
on) granted to the non-governmental Icelandic fund (Tryggingarsjóður). 
This builds on the fact that Member States retained their own de-
posit guarantee schemes, which required that foreign banks operating 
abroad be invited to top up their guarantee by becoming parties to the 
host country scheme so as to equalise guarantees for all banks compe-
ting on the same market, as prescribed in Directive 94/19/EC: 
Whereas the retention in the Community of schemes providing cover 
for deposits which is higher than the harmonized minimum may, 
within the same territory, lead to disparities in compensation and 
unequal conditions of competition between national institutions and 
branches of institutions from other Member States; whereas, in or-
der to counteract those disadvantages, branches should be authori-
zed to join their host countries’ schemes so that they can offer their 
33 See Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ERTA ECR 263. For exclusive EU com-
petency, see Opinion 1/75, Local Cost Standards [1975] ECR 1355, 1363; Opinion 2/91, 
ILO Convention 170 on Chemicals at Work, [1993] ECR I-1061; Case C-268/94 Portuguese 
Republic v Council [1996] ECR I-6177.
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depositors the same guarantees as are offered by the schemes of the 
countries in which they are located.34
This provides for a guarantee system abroad in the host state of the forei-
gn branch, and not the system at home (in this case Iceland), ie a provi-
sion related to banks operating abroad, in this case the Icesave branches 
of Landsbanki in its UK and Dutch operations. Secondly, the topping-up 
is carried out by branches abroad by contributing membership fees of 
0.15% of their share capital. 
Icesave Bank became a member of the UK and Dutch deposit gua-
rantee schemes, which subsequently qualified Icesave depositors for the 
UK and Dutch reimbursements. For the British fund, the following was 
said on the Landsbanki subscription to the British deposit guarantee 
scheme: ‘The firms that have topped up into the UK Scheme are listed 
below with their FSA reference numbers and the month and year FSCS or 
the predecessor scheme accepted their application to top up. In Iceland, 
Landsbanki Islands …’35
Since Tryggingarsjóður was hopelessly out of funding, the UK and 
Dutch funds reimbursed all UK and Dutch depositors in full, with a view 
to claiming against Iceland for a refund. In practical terms, this means 
that the Icelandic compensation scheme should pay out to all depositors 
at the maximum level of EUR 20,887.36 The Agreement ensured that ‘UK 
taxpayers are refunded for the compensation the UK Government paid 
out via the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) on behalf of 
the Icelandic Depositors’ … Fund … to Icesave retail depositors with the 
UK branch of Landsbanki’. The government of Iceland guaranteed reim-
bursement within a period of 15 years, but enjoyed respite for the first 
7 years. In the final 8 years, the refund of the loan and interest should 
take place. As it became clear to everyone that Tryggingarsjóður, due to 
the slow growth in funding because of the modest deposits in Icelandic 
banks today, would not be capable of servicing the debt, the guarantee 
of the Icelandic state became the salient point. It was further agreed that 
there would be a system to pay back to the FSCS any compensation from 
the administrators in the Landsbanki bankruptcy case that devolved on 
Tryggingarsjóður. 
As pointed out by Iceland, the validity of the Agreement depends 
upon the national ratification process. This ratification never took place 
34 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on 
deposit-guarantee schemes, preamble, 13th recital [1994] OJ L135/5.
35 Financial Service Authority accepts Landsbanki Islands hf (FSA No 207250/July 2006) 
<http://www.fscs.org.uk/consumer/making_a_claim/deposits/EEA_firms_that_have_
topped_up/> accessed 8 October 2010.
36 Press release by the Government of the Netherlands (13 October 13 2009).
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because the compulsory sanctioning of the Icelandic President in accor-
dance with the Icelandic Constitution, Article 26, was denied.
The Agreement states the understanding that both the United King-
dom and the Netherlands recognise, as part of the Icesave Agreement, 
the Icelandic Icesave Act of 28 August 2009 (No 96/2009). This Act was 
amended on 30 December 2010 (Act No 1/2010 on the State Guarantee 
for Loans by Security Schemes for the Benefit of Depositors).37 The UK po-
sition on these amendments was as follows: ‘Iceland reaffirms its binding 
guarantee of the obligations of the Icelandic Deposit Guarantee Fund to 
compensate UK and Dutch depositors with Icesave without admitting any 
pre-existing legal obligation to provide that support’.38 Thus, the British 
position is that Iceland stands by its guarantee without regard to what 
might have been prior conditions. However, these issues, due to the refe-
rendum of 6 March 201039 are beyond the scope of this article.40
Does the Icelandic action prior to the agreement with the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands result in legal obligations for Iceland? Co-
uld one say that talks and diplomatic action, aide memoirs, etc produce 
more or less contingent obligations for the Icelandic state to comply with? 
‘The UK government has made it clear repeatedly that this decision to 
protect UK depositors in Icelandic banks was made after extensive con-
versations with the Icelandic government.’41 The political contact betwe-
en Iceland’s Minister of Finance Arni Mathiesen and the UK Treasury 
Secretary Alistair Darling resulted in the following: ‘At no point does the 
Icelandic finance minister state unequivocally that Iceland would not ho-
nour its obligations. Instead, Mr Mathiesen says that Iceland plans to use 
its compensation scheme to try to meet obligations to British depositors’. 
In response to direct questions from Mr Darling, Mr Mathiesen said the 
following: ‘We have the [deposit] insurance fund according to the Directi-
ve and how that works is explained in this letter [to the UK] and the pled-
ge of support from the government to the fund.’ Mr. Darling followed up: 
‘So the entitlements the people have which I think is about £16,000, they 
will be paid?’ Ari Mathiesen answered: ‘Well, I hope that will be the case. 
I cannot state that or guarantee that now but we are certainly working 
to solve this issue. This is something we really don’t want to have han-
ging over us.’ Clearly, any legally binding international obligation cannot 
follow from this conversation. 
37 Althingi Decision (30 December 2009) (33 for and 30 against).
38 See HM Treasury press release no 94/09 (19 October 2009) paragraph 10.
39 98.4% voted no and 1.6% yes. Voter turnout was 62.4%.
40 See statement by the Government of Iceland (press release 6 March 2010) ‘Work contin-
ues on a mutually acceptable solution to Icesave … Early figures indicate a decisive result 
and assuming final results in line with these figures, Act 1/2010 will be automatically re-
pealed pursuant to Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Iceland’.
41 Transcript of telephone conversation, Financial Times (London 23 October 2008). 
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A Dutch presentation on Icesave stated the following: 
the deposit-guarantee scheme is predicated on an EU directive that 
obligates governments to ensure that the minimum deposit insuran-
ce protection of EUR 20,000 is provided for ... We are aware that in 
a response to a request for clarification regarding the governmental 
backing of the Icelandic deposit guaranty scheme, the government of 
Iceland has at least in one instance issued a letter clarifying its role 
in the funding of that scheme and reiterating its obligation pursuant 
to the relevant EU directive.42 
The latter citation illustrates the Landsbanki understanding of the 
public liabilities of Iceland. Any additional obligation to EC Directive 
94/19 is out of the question.
The ongoing joint considerations and negotiations on reimburse-
ment illustrate that no agreement has been reached and that the Icelan-
dic referendum is recognised by the UK and the Dutch: 
Over the past several weeks there has been steady progress toward a 
settlement. In the context of these new talks, the British and Dutch 
Governments have indicated a willingness to accept a solution that 
will entail a significantly lower cost for Iceland than that envisaged 
in the prior agreement … The three governments have declared their 
intention to continue the talks and find a solution to the matter.43
In conclusion, I would like to add that the former Minister of Finan-
ce, Ari Mathiesen,44  maintained that Iceland’s responsibility was limited 
to the EEA Agreement provisions. This consistent position is mirrored by 
an Icelandic press release:45 ‘During the talks, the Icelandic negotiating 
team has also put forward a proposal which entails that Iceland guaran-
tees full payment of deposits up to the minimum laid down by EEA rules.’ 
Thus, Iceland admits its obligations within the limits of the EU Directi-
ves, especially EC Directive 94/19. For new obligations to occur, a new 
agreement is needed. As any solution is still pending, the correct position 
is that the legal state is mirrored by the above-mentioned directive. 
The following discussion relates the analysis of EEA/EU competition 
law to Icelandic legislation on bankruptcy and deposit guarantee funds.
3.3. The ESA position: a discussion
This section elaborates on the ESA criticism of Iceland. Is the ESA 
position based on safe legal grounds? I am considering here the issues 
42 Hreinsson et al (n 7) 57.
43 Statement of the Government of Iceland (Press Release 6 March 2010).
44 A Mathiesen (personal communication in the Althing, 11 January 2009).
45 Icelandic Government  press release (Reykjavik March 2010).
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raised in the ESA Letter of Formal Notice of 26 May 2010. A basic diffi-
culty is what the problem under discussion is all about. One issue is 
whether domestic Icelandic provisions may preclude individuals from 
claiming compensation for damages resulting from defective supervision 
on the part of that authority. Another is whether Iceland’s actions have 
met the required objectives.
Clearly Member States bound by the Directive have an obligation to 
achieve the results envisaged by it. There is no disagreement that Mem-
ber States should take all necessary measures to accordingly ensure ful-
filment of their obligations, as stated by the European Court of Justice 
on several occasions: ‘to take all appropriate measures, whether general 
or particular, to ensure the fulfillment of that obligation’.46 I have no diffi-
culty in adhering to that position. The discussion, however, concerns the 
reach of national obligations according to Directive 94/19/EC. This is 
discussed below.
3.3.1. The ‘obligations of result’
1. ESA’s understanding is that the EEA requirements of Member 
States to produce ‘obligations of result’47 are not satisfied in the case of 
Iceland, as: 
the objective of the Directive to enhance depositor protection would 
be compromised if the Directive were interpreted as only obliging 
Member States to set up a deposit guarantee scheme without any 
obligations to actually ensure that the aggrieved depositors are pro-
vided with compensation.48 
The ESA position is that since ‘neither the Fund nor the Government 
have ensured payment to those depositors … [to] whom deposits became 
unavailable within the meaning of the Directive, Iceland has failed to 
comply with its obligation under Article 7’.49 Therefore, the competent 
authorities (in Iceland the FME) should not only verify the credit insti-
tutions’ compliance with the conditions of Directive 94/19/EC but also 
make certain that depositors de facto enjoy compensation in full: ‘From 
this reasoning, it can be inferred that if compensation of depositors pre-
scribed by the Directive is not ensured in the event that deposits become 
unavailable … the State should be held liable’.50
The EU seems to support ESA here: 
46 See Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891 
para 26. 
47 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 6.
48 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 13.
49 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 8.
50 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 9.
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The Commission considers that in the specific case of Iceland, the 
liability of the Icelandic State for the reimbursement due by the 
Icelandic Deposit Guarantee Scheme to the EU depositors stems 
from the defective implementation of the Directive in Iceland. The ca-
pacity of the scheme was not proportionate in relation to the size and 
risks posed by the Icelandic banking sector.51
I disagree.52 My position derives from the Directive’s preamble, 24th 
recital, which reads as follows: 
this Directive may not result in the Member States’ or their compe-
tent authorities’ being made liable in respect of depositors if they 
have ensured that one or more schemes guaranteeing deposits or 
credit institutions themselves and ensuring the compensation or 
protection of depositors under the conditions prescribed in this Di-
rective have been introduced and officially recognized. 
 ‘Proportionate capacity’, meaning that Tryggingarsjóður should fully re-
fund all deposits from day one, is not among the liabilities of Directive 
94/19/EC (see paragraph 3.3.4). 
2. While ESA mainly argues its case on the basis of the Directive’s 
preamble, 24th recital, the answer to national state obligations follows 
from Article 3.1, read in conjunction with the 13th and the 23rd recitals. 
As clearly indicated, and which has escaped the considerations of ESA, 
the actual financing of the system is nothing but a private enterprise: 
‘the cost of financing such schemes must be borne, in principle, by cre-
dit institutions themselves’ (Directive 94/19/EC, preamble, 23rd recital). 
This is further elaborated on in Article 3.1 (which is also not emphasised 
by ESA): ‘the system must not consist of a guarantee granted to a credit 
institution by a Member State itself or by any of its local or regional aut-
horities’. This provision should be read in the context of the preamble, 
13th recital:
Whereas the retention in the Community of schemes providing cover 
for deposits which is higher than the harmonized minimum may, 
within the same territory, lead to disparities in compensation and 
unequal conditions of competition between national institutions and 
branches of institutions from other Member States. 
This text clearly indicates that the deposit guarantee scheme is pro-
hibited from any steps that may lead to distortion of competition, which 
51 Hughes (n 4) emphasis added.
52 See also Blöndal et al (n 27) 11 ‘The national State’s responsibility according to Direc-
tive No 94/19 occurs only if the State fails to establish provisions or fails to comply with 
commitments deriving from the Directive. In this case, State liability is a possibility and 
compensation may result if the prerequisites are fulfilled. No indication exists, however, 
that confirm their existence’.
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may very well result if Member States of the EU/EEA are allowed to throw 
money into their own schemes: 
Nearly all countries regulate their banking industries quite heavily. 
In part, such regulation reflects formal and informal government po-
licies that choose to subsidize troubled banks instead of letting them 
fail. Some regulation is motivated by the belief that governments will 
not permit their banks to fail and impose losses on depositors.53 
Such policies are not in accordance with EU competition goals. The 
financial sector should be unshackled from state subsidisation and other 
discriminatory practices, otherwise a ‘race to the bottom’ is a distinct 
possibility.54
3. Competition law prohibits ‘unequal conditions of competition 
between national institutions and branches of institutions from other 
Member States’ (Directive 94/19/EC, preamble, 13th recital). Clearly, it 
‘is not appropriate that the level of scope of cover offered by guarantee 
schemes should become an instrument of competition’ (preamble, 14th 
recital). If the Directive is interpreted so as to place the government of 
Iceland with pecuniary responsibility, the Member State has breached 
the ban on state subsidisation.
The EU Directive on depositor guarantee schemes does not imply 
any duty on the part of Iceland to top up or in any way provide monetary 
support to the fund. There is no provision that makes the government of 
Iceland liable to pay EUR 20,887 to British and Dutch depositors as a 
result of the failing depositor guarantee fund. On the contrary, national 
states are prohibited from contributing to the fund. In the case of insuffi-
cient funds due to collapse or bankruptcy, the answer is private insuran-
ce against insufficiency (Article 7). Thus, Directive 94/19/EC does not 
entitle the establishment of any reimbursement system.
Directive 94/19/EC does not provide any other route for the rescue 
of Icesave Bank depositors. Thus, whether or not private depositors are 
excluded from any action, Iceland and other national states may not by 
their own efforts pump money into the failing fund. However, no Direc-
tive provision prohibits states from granting money to depositors. This 
conclusion results from the basic presumption in TFEU Article 107(3): 
‘by decision of the Council on a proposal from the Commission’. This ac-
tion, however, has never taken place. 
53 MJ Flannery, ‘The Importance of Government Supervision in Producing Financial Ser-
vices’ in Vidauki 8 til Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis, report prepared for the Icelandic Spe-
cial Investigation Commission  (Reykjavik 2009) s 3 <http://sic.althingi.is/pdf/RNAvefVi-
dauki3Enska.pdf > accessed 22 October 2010.
54 See Dubel (n 9).
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4. The position of the Icelandic government is that it has ‘fully com-
plied with its obligations under Directive 94/19/EC. The government has 
no further obligation based on the Directive than to set up a Guarantee 
Scheme in line with the Directive’.55 The role of the national state is to ini-
tiate the establishment of, supervise, control and sanction the depositor 
guarantee scheme: ‘Each Member State shall ensure that within its terri-
tory one or more deposit-guarantee schemes are introduced and officially 
recognized’ (Article 3.1). In addition, it is clear that the Member State 
shall check that branches, such as the Icesave branch of Landsbanki and 
other Icelandic banks, operating abroad ‘have cover equivalent to that 
prescribed in this Directive’ (Article 6.1). However, it is not the responsi-
bility of the national state to inform depositors of the ‘amount and scope 
of cover offered by the guarantee scheme’ (Article 9.1). This responsibility 
does not even rest with the Fund, but with the credit institutions of the 
financial industry. 
Here the question is whether Iceland’s depository protection sche-
mes are construed as provided for by the Directive. With Act No 98/1999 
on Deposit Guarantee Schemes and Investment Compensation Systems 
and the Trade Department Statute of 21 February 2000, Iceland has 
transposed the EEA rules of Directive 94/19/EC. Both Tryggingasjóður 
and the existence of a guarantee sum have been established, as has the 
supervision of Tryggingasjóður by the Icelandic Financial Supervisory 
Authority, Fjármálaeftirlitsins (FME). The required fee system of funding 
the deposit guarantee scheme has been set up, ie a tax of 0.15% on bank 
deposits for the previous year, the minimum of which is 100 million Ice-
landic krónur. When it comes to monitoring Iceland’s performance, it is a 
common understanding that 
[a]s Icesave was operated under a Landsbanki branch, EU/EEA ru-
les stipulate that control of its activities shall be in principle the 
responsibility of the FME in Iceland, although, pursuant to the same 
rules, the FSA UK was to supervise the liquidity management of 
the branch and, furthermore, was authorised to intervene in the 
branch’s market behaviour related to Icesave.56 
5. How can it be assessed whether or not the national scheme is in 
line with the relevant provisions? Some arguments can be derived from 
the Case of Peter Paul and Others:
Directive 94/19, Article 3(2) to (5) thereof does not confer on depo-
sitors a right to have the competent authorities take supervisory 
measures in their interest … That interpretation of Directive 94/19 
55 Letter of the Icelandic Government to the Authority 23 March 2010, 5.
56 Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis, Special Investigation Commission (SIC) Report 12 April 2010 
ch 18, p 5.
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is supported by the 24th recital in the preamble thereto, which states 
that the directive may not result in the Member States’ or their com-
petent authorities’ being made liable in respect of depositors if they 
have ensured the compensation or protection of depositors under 
the conditions prescribed in the directive.57
The salient point is whether governmental responsibilities, named 
by the ESA as obligations of result, relate to pecuniary refunding or re-
gulatory activity, or both. As stated, the obligation is fulfilled either by 
ensuring the compensation or protection of depositors as prescribed in 
Directive 94/19/EC. If so, such Member State action pre-empts depo-
sitors’ legal proceedings. The deposit guarantee scheme is, as stated in 
the 23rd recital, fully self-financing. Tryggingasjóður is a private fund. 
Accordingly, it suffices that the fund’s domicile state has arranged for 
the necessary protection in accordance with the 94/19/EC prescriptions. 
Consequently, as stated in Article 3.1, it is a directive to the legislator to 
act. It is not a directive to the government to pay; ‘the system must not 
consist of a guarantee granted to a credit institution by a Member State 
itself or by any of its local or regional authorities’. 
Thus two conclusions seem appropriate: first of all, the EEA or EU 
Member State should not contribute monetarily to the establishment of 
the fund. Secondly, no public payment is entitled if insufficient funding 
is demonstrated at the time of a bank collapsing. 
3.3.2. Is Tryggingasjóður a twin of the government of Iceland?
Or, otherwise formulated, should the deposit guarantee fund of Ice-
land include not only Tryggingasjóður but the entire Icelandic treasury? 
The ESA understanding is that a Member State’s obligation goes further. 
Not only does the system initiate and implement requirements, the go-
vernment of Iceland, as ESA understands it, is responsible for de facto re-
muneration of depositors. Despite the Guarantee Scheme’s private foun-
dations (Article 3.1), ESA identifies Tryggingasjóður with the government 
of Iceland: ‘Finally, the Authority considers that the Fund forms part of 
the Icelandic State within the meaning of the EEA Agreement although it 
is, in Icelandic law, constituted as a private foundation’.58 As a result; ‘the 
Fund is to be regarded, for the purposes of EEA law and Directive 94/19/
EC, as an emanation of the Icelandic State’.59 
From this platform, ESA construes a national state liability additio-
nal to Tryggingasjóður to ensure that the necessary results are attained 
57 Case C-222/02 Peter Paul and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2004] ECR  I-09425 
paras 30-31 emphasis added.
58 See EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 9.
59 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 10.
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‘if the Deposit Guarantee Fund established under the Directive fails to 
achieve the result prescribed’.60 
The implication of this is that the national state with its assets in 
toto is responsible for the remuneration of depositors in the case of fi-
nancial crisis. Thus the ruin of the equal competition that resulted from 
unilateral topping up of deposit guarantee schemes, which was so heavily 
criticised,61 is instantly put into effect by the ESA interpretation. My posi-
tion is that ESA confuses the statutory subjects. No provision invites the 
mixing of a private fund’s obligation to pay with that of a public agency. 
As stated above (section 3.3.1), there is no way that Directive 94/19/EC 
imposes pecuniary obligations on the domicile state. 
3.3.3. Depositors’ legal interests
The ESA view is that ‘individual depositors have rights conferred on 
them by the directive’.62 If that is the case, the question arises whether 
these rights are against the Icelandic government. Clearly, rights exist 
in relation to Tryggingarsjóður. However, the Directive does not promote 
analogies between the Fund’s depositor liability and the liability of the 
national state. As justified in Peter Paul and Others, the liability ratio ju-
risdictione personae is limited. 
[I]f the compensation of depositors prescribed by Directive 94/19 is 
ensured, Article 3(2) to (5) thereof cannot be interpreted as preclu-
ding a national rule to the effect that the functions of the national 
authority responsible for supervising credit institutions are to be 
fulfilled only in the public interest, which under national law preclu-
des individuals from claiming compensation for damage resulting 
from defective supervision on the part of that authority (paragraphs 
30-32). 
Since the provisions are issued by means of a directive, the main 
addressee is the Member State and not its citizens, with the exception 
of cases of direct applicability which follow from a close interpretation of 
the Directive text.63 Member State liability to prescribe a compensation 
system as construed by Directive 94/19/EC should be ensured, not the 
compensation as such. Thus, private depositors have no right to reim-
bursement vis-à-vis national authorities if the national state otherwise 
satisfies its obligations according to the Directive. As is clear from its 
domestic legislation and political statements, Iceland has no intention of 
60 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 12.
61 As documented in Wikipedia (n 10).
62 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 7.
63 As stated by the European Court of Justice in Case 1974/41 van Duyn v Home Office 
[1974] ECR 1337, provisions, if the text is explicit enough, may enjoy direct application.
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transposing or implementing requirements beyond the Directive.64 Thus, 
depositors can raise no liability claims against the government of Iceland. 
Accordingly, the ESA position here is ill-considered and out of touch with 
legal realities. 
3.3.4. Is it a minimum deposit, a maximum, or both?
Alternatively, if ‘obligations of result on the EFTA States’65 are not 
met in the case of the Icesave collapse, the question is whether the de 
facto refund of depositors’ money as guaranteed in Directive 94/19/EC is 
measured by a minimum or maximum reimbursement sum?
The answer here relates to whether the national state owes any obli-
gation to reimburse depositors the minimum sum of EUR 20,000. The 
textual interpretation is clear: it is the sum up to EUR 20,000 that is 
guaranteed. Does, for example, EUR 5,000 or 10,000 etc satisfy the pro-
vision? In other words, is the ‘up-to’ provision a prospective goal to be 
reached or is it a legal right to be enforced by the depositor? 
The ESA position implies that the sum of EUR 20,887 is a minimum. 
Seemingly, this is supported by the text in the preamble: ‘whereas it wo-
uld appear reasonable to set the harmonized minimum guarantee level 
at ECU 20,000; whereas limited transitional arrangements might be ne-
cessary to enable schemes to comply with that figure’ (Directive 94/19/
EC, preamble, 16th recital). Clearly; the founding fathers of this text con-
sider ECU 20,000 (now EUR) as a suitable guarantee sum. Interpreting 
this text, one should keep in mind that the addressees are twofold: both 
the national state and deposit fund on the one hand, and the depositor 
on the other, the latter by means of direct applicability. The depositor 
relation dictates that no one may extract more money from the fund than 
is actually deposited in the bank. This is obvious, and I have no further 
interest in this.
However, as I understand the text, as far as the national state and 
guarantee deposit fund are concerned, 20,000 is the ultimate target of the 
deposit guarantee schemes to be fulfilled in the years to come. Since the 
text is a directive and not a regulation, the provisions point out directions 
and objectives to be reached, but not an exact non-discretionary legal cla-
im as of day one. Thus, it is for the Member State or even the guarantee 
deposit scheme to decide whether the maximum is also a minimum from 
day one or whether another sum is appropriate in the period of building 
64 See transcript (n 40) in connection with n 43 and n 44.
65 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 7. The same view is made even more explicit in the 
ESA press release of 26 May 2010: ‘Iceland is obliged to ensure payment of the minimum 
compensation to Icesave depositors in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, according 
to the Deposit Guarantee Directive’. 
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up the fund. The idea behind the prescriptions is the need for time in 
working up basic capital (of which the Icelandic fund at the date of the 
bank’s collapse possessed EUR 17.5 million). There is no timeframe wit-
hin which sufficient funding should be achieved. Article 3.1 states ‘Each 
Member State shall ensure that within its territory one or more deposit-
guarantee schemes are introduced and officially recognized’ (emphasis 
added). The national state liability is to establish legal systems of com-
pulsory membership of such funds and also to license the funds. This is 
what the requirements are all about. Clearly, there is no provision forcing 
upon Member States a fully functional system lock, stock and barrel from 
day one. In Article 7.4, the question is one of a ‘percentage guaranteed’, 
which relates to the ‘aggregate deposits until the amount to be paid un-
der the guarantee reaches the amount referred to in paragraph 1’. Again, 
it is implicitly said that the guarantee sum is not fixed, but accumulative 
and increasing until it has reached its maximum level of EUR 20,000.
The EU recognises that the set up of fully workable schemes may 
take time: 
for certain classes of credit institutions which take only an extremely 
small proportion of deposits, the introduction of such a system may 
in some cases take longer than the time laid down for the transpo-
sition of this Directive; whereas in such cases a transitional deroga-
tion from the requirement to belong to a deposit-guarantee scheme 
may be justified; whereas, however, should such credit institutions 
operate abroad, a Member State would be entitled to require their 
participation in a deposit-guarantee scheme which it had set up.66
Thus, for financial institutions that operate abroad and who suffer 
from insufficient guarantees at home, foreign systems of deposit security 
schemes should come to the rescue. If we call to mind the Icesave case, 
we see that while national Icelandic coverage was failing, British and 
Dutch schemes took care of their own domestic depositors through the 
Icesave membership of these schemes – the topping up procedure.
The case of Peter Paul and Others does not support the minimum 
position.67 ‘The depositor’s right to compensation … is governed by Article 
7(1) and (6) of that directive. Article 7(1) determines the maximum amou-
nt of compensation …’ (Paragraph 27, emphasis added). This maximum 
is stipulated as follows: ‘aggregate deposits of each depositor must be 
covered up to ECU 20,000’ (Article 7(1)).
This amount is not, as in the ESA position, a minimum reimbur-
sement obligation. It is a conditional minimum and a maximum at the 
66 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 7.
67 Peter Paul (n 56).
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same time. The minimum should be read under a ratione jurisdictione 
terminae limitation. This understanding is supported by the reading of 
the second paragraph of Article 7 (1): ‘Until 31 December 1999 Member 
States in which, when this Directive is adopted, deposits are not covered 
up to ECU 20,000 may retain the maximum amount laid down in the-
ir guarantee schemes, provided that this amount is not less than ECU 
15,000’. Here, former guarantee schemes older than the year 2000 may 
be retained, though not if below EUR 15,000. This means that 15,000 
is the maximum for countries that would like to retain their previous 
maximum level. The provision does not, however, say anything on the 
minimum in such countries. 
In case the Member State maximum deposit guarantee is less than 
15,000, this country is obliged to increase the fund ‘up to’ EUR 20,000. 
As stated in Directive 94/19/EC Article 3.1, it is a directive to the legisla-
tor to act. It is not a directive to the government to pay; ‘the system must 
not consist of a guarantee granted to a credit institution by a Member 
State itself or by any of its local or regional authorities’. 
No minimum limit relates to new schemes founded during this last 
decennium. Thus, while EUR 20,000 is a goal towards which Member 
States should direct their regulations, it is not required that such a sum 
be instantly in place, and that the fund be de facto capable of reimbur-
sing depositors in the event of financial breakdown. It takes time to work 
up capital. Deposit guarantee funds are allowed to take their time. See, 
as an illustration, the case described in the preamble, recital 16; ‘limi-
ted transitional arrangements’. This covers the Icelandic Tryggingasjóður 
scheme, which was in a build-up phase. As the fund pay-out is final, this 
solution is supported by the fact that the deposit guarantee fund in the 
event of insufficient coverage is distributed to depositors on a pro rata 
scaling-down basis. 
3.3.5. Does Iceland discriminate against foreign depositors?
1. The ESA claims that the ‘domestic depositors of Landsbanki were 
transferred to a new bank “new Landsbanki” … The domestic depositors 
had thereby access to their funds in full at all time’.68 The discrimination 
argument seems at first sight to carry. As said in Directive 94/19/EC, 
preamble 3rd recital: ‘in the event of the closure of an insolvent credit 
institution the depositors at any branches situated in a Member State 
other than that in which the credit institution has its head office must be 
protected by the same guarantee scheme as the institution’s other depo-
sitors’. Accordingly, foreign depositors are protected by Tryggingasjóður 
as well. No one seems to object to this perception.
68 EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 2. 
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However, for ESA, this is not the case. On one hand, there are the 
Icelandic regulatory competences, which happen to bring about disad-
vantages to foreigners in contravention of the EEA Agreement Article 4,69 
and on the other there is the issue of civil law acquisitions, which is the 
case here. My position is that the EEA agreement does not ordain which 
investments to make. National states, like private enterprises, may po-
ssess companies (in this case financial institutions), which according to 
the EEA Agreement Article 125 are beyond the scope of the agreement.70 
The government of Iceland is fully sovereign as to which commercial en-
gagements to undertake. Iceland and other national states enjoy full au-
tonomy in their commercial considerations. The takeover of Landsbanki 
does not necessitate the takeover of Icesave. This is my primary position.
2. An alternative position is to say that an Icelandic takeover bid for 
Landsbanki that leaves out Icesave is in itself not discriminatory in a na-
tional sense, as all foreign depositors in the old Landsbanki were offered 
identical solutions to domestic depositors. This includes all depositors, 
whether they are domiciled in Iceland or not. Icelandic citizens abroad 
might deposit money in Icesave.
I concur with Blöndal, Líndal and Stefánsson’s views.71 As a starting 
point, no subsidiary EU statutes (directives or regulations) may contradict 
EU treaties (in this case TFEU Article 107 – illicit state aid),72 and neither 
may national provisions. The situation is similar under EEA Article 61 
with regard to Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. State aid is prohibited 
if not otherwise explicitly decided on by the Council (or the Commission). 
As it is commonly acknowledged that illegal subsidisation relates to the 
consequences not the intentions,73 the effects of national state guaran-
tees on the Deposit Guarantee Schemes are fully established.
The salient point is whether the Icelandic Guarantee Scheme, which 
requires that the Icelandic state top up the fund, contravenes EC Directi-
ve No 94/19. Since the Directive is decisive, one does not need to include 
TFEU/EEA treaty interpretations. The Directive was drafted under the in-
fluence of competition law measures and aims to avoid situations in which 
schemes providing cover for deposits which is higher than the har-
monized minimum … within the same territory, lead to disparities 
69 For a closer look at the provision, see S Norberg, K Hökberg and others, The European 
Economic Area. EEA Law. A Commentary on the EEA Agreement (Fritzes, Stockholm 1993) 
102-103.
70 Peter Orebech,  ‘The Art of Subsidizing Fuel Free Electricity under the European Econo-
mic Area Agreement as Illustrated by the Norway Reversion Instrument’ (2010) 74 Chicago-
Kent Law Review 101-129.
71 Blöndal et al (n 27) 11.
72 ESA misses out the state aid perspective. Nowhere is subsidisation up for discussion. 
See EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2). 
73 J Shaw, The European Union Law (Palgrave, Basingstoke 2000) 30.
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in compensation and unequal conditions of competition between na-
tional institutions and branches of institutions from other Member 
States. (preamble, 13th recital) 
or which consist of ‘a guarantee granted to a credit institution by a Mem-
ber State itself or by any of its local or regional authorities’ (Article 3.1).
4. Taking the alternative route: Icelandic bankruptcy law 
If not otherwise provided for in legislation, creditors are subject to 
bankruptcy law proceedings in cases of insolvency and insufficiency for 
sharing remaining possessions on an equal footing. 
The owner of the Icesave internet bank, Landsbanki Islands is under 
investigation, which may end up in composition or bankruptcy. The Ice-
land Finance Surveillance Committee put the bank under administration 
on 7 October 2008 in accordance with the Lög um fjármálafyrirtæki (the 
Financial Industries Act) of 20 December 2002 No 161 Article 100 a. It is 
expected that proceedings will last several years.74 
Bankruptcy is dealt with in accordance with the Icelandic Lög um 
gjaldþrotaskipti. (Bankruptcy Act) of 26 March 1991 No 21. The Financial 
Institutions Act, Article 98 Paragraph 2, explicitly states that the Ban-
kruptcy Act relates to ‘a financial institution’s right to apply for a period 
of grace or composition’. We are told that ‘general bankruptcy rules are 
valid for the liquidation of finance institutions with regard to mutual con-
tractual rights and obligations’. 
 The position of depositors has improved resulting from amendments 
that took place in the aftermath of the Icesave failure. Secured creditors 
replaced unsecured ones. Accordingly, ‘the amendments result in the 
account-holder gaining strength in the final distribution of assets’. 75 One 
issue, however, should be considered, and that is the possibility of setting 
aside fraudulent preferences if conditions are satisfied (see Chapter XX 
in Lög um gjaldþrotaskipti – the Bankruptcy Act).Thus, by implementing 
such instruments, depositors’ losses will remain where they belong: with 
the chief executive officers (CEOs) that plunged the financial institutions 
of Iceland over the cliff.
Following this line of thought, depositors’ only option is to chase up 
the assets of the failing Landsbanki through bankruptcy proceedings. In 
this way, depositors are forced to follow the general path taken by all fai-
ling companies. As always, the option of special treatment for bankruptcy 
debtors needs special arrangements. However, no special arrangements 
have been construed or singled out under Icelandic competition law with 
74 Statement by Professor Thoralfur Matthiasson (University of Island) Aftenposten (Oslo 6 
January 2010).
75 Blöndal et al (n 27). 
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regard to the implementation of EC Directive 94/19. Thus, bankruptcy 
proceedings are all that are available to depositors or their successors, 
the Dutch and British states respectively.
5. Conclusion
The EU/EEA financial sector is in principle self-financing, a position 
that however is not shared by ESA.76 Funding the depositor guarantee 
schemes is subtracted from the 0.15% tax on Icelandic banks’ total as-
sets. In the case of insufficiency, the scheme may borrow money, whether 
private or public. Another option is to insure against unexpected and 
uncovered losses. There are no other ways. Going for a national state 
guarantee prompted by insufficiency, as is the case with Tryggingasjóður 
in the Icesave case, is a breach of Directive 94/19/EC. 
However, an agreement on the Icesave reimbursement, financed 
by loans taken out by Tryggingasjóður, stripped of any guarantees from 
the Icelandic government, is clearly legal, as the growing scheme alone 
should service the loan. 
Since a depositor guarantee scheme may not operate as a means of 
competition, it is equally prohibited to implement legal systems the effect 
of which is distortion of competition. State funding cannot be brought 
into national depositor guarantee schemes, as stated in Directive 94/19/
EC. In the event of lacking coverage, all depositors suffer from a pro rata 
scaling-down. National state ‘filling in’ is clearly unwarranted. A possible 
new system requires amendments to this Directive. Such amendments 
should be transposed into EEA law to become binding in Iceland. I am 
afraid that no initiative has yet been undertaken to fill this gap.77
The following is the conclusion of this survey: neither the government 
nor the people of Iceland should pay for the failure of Icesave Bank. The 
Landsbanki-Icesave CEO’s responsibility cannot be doubted. As stated 
in Directive 94/19/EC, preamble, recital 19, one vital objective is ‘to en-
courage depositors to look carefully at the quality of credit institutions’. 
Clearly, it is a directive to the legislator to act. It is not a directive to the 
government to pay. Depositors should critically assess bank leadership 
before trusting private funding to the bank. The bank deposit rules are 
published. Those seeking high profits are also subject to high risks.
This solution places responsibility where it belongs, with the leader-
ship of the banks and the CEO that failed to run the company and keep 
it afloat. Such a solution does not spoil the expectations of depositors. 
76 On the contrary; EFTA Surveillance Authority (n 2) 9. 
77 See Financial Services Directive (n 5), which does not introduce state aid as an appropri-
ate instrument. On the contrary, a new harmonised deposit guarantee scheme system will 
result. See Financial Services (n 5).
